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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---oooOooo---
BRUCE E. HOLMES, d/b/a 
HOLMES REALTY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Case No. 16549 
vs. 
DeGRAFF ASSOCIATES, INC., 
Defendant-Respondent. 
---oooOooo---
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff-Appellant Bruce E. Holmes replies to the 
Brief of Respondents: 
POINT I. AFTER THE REPUDIATION, RESCISSION, DISCHARGE OF 
THE OPTION AND THE MERGER OF ALL AGREEMENTS OF THE PARTIES 
INTO THE FINAL CONTRACT DOCUMENTS, THE OPTION CEASED TO 
HAVE ANY LEGAL OR BINDING EFFECT UPON EITHER PARTY. 
In the brief of appellant, Bruce E. Holmes ("Holmes") 
has shown that the Option was repudiated (Point I), the option 
was rescinded and discharged (Point II and Point IV), and that 
all of the agreements of the parties merged into the final con-
tract documents (Point III). In addition, Holmes has shown 
that the Option should be ruled void as a matter of law because 
of the rule against perpetuities (Point V). The central issue 
in this case is whether on July 15, 1977, when DeGraff Asso-
ciates and American Development Company signed the Purchase 
Agreement, Assignment of Contract, Warranty Deed, Escrow In-
structions and Escrow Statements, (l) any portion of the Option 
was valid and enforceable, or (2) the Option had been repu-
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diated, discharged, rescinded or it was otherwise void in its 
entirety. 
In this connection, the facts can be simplified as 
follows: After discussions between Holmes and Clara DeGraff, 
an officer of DeGraff Associates, on June 17, 1977 Clara 
DeGraff signed and delivered to Holmes an Option. Paragraph 8 
of the Option contained a commission provision in which "0" was 
inserted in the blank space for the commission percentage. If 
paid strictly in accordance with its terms, the Option would 
never be paid in full: the interest which would accrue annually 
exceeded the minimum annual payments. From the date the Option 
was signed and received, DeGraff Associates asserted its unen-
forceability and expressly told Holmes that the Option would 
not be honored or performed by DeGraff Associates as written. 
Between June 17 and July 14, DeGraff Associates consistently 
reiterated its position that the Option was unenforceable. 
DeGraff Associates' legal counsel told Holmes that the Option 
was not valid, "there were about four or five reasons al-
together why he considered that option invalid as written and 
therefore, the DeGraffs could not be held to it." In each in-
stance, Holmes asserted the Option was valid and enforceable. 
Nevertheless, DeGraff Associates continued to assert its unen-
forceability and clearly indicated that it would not perform in 
accordance with the terms of the Option. On July 15, 1977, 
DeGraff Associates and American Development Company entered 
into a real estate contract. The only terms of the real estate 
contract which had any similarity to the terms of the Option 
( 2) 
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were the property itself and the purchase price. The payment 
schedule was substantially different, and the agreement and the 
documents signed concurrently therewith provided the following 
terms or provisions not mentioned in the option: (1) estab-
lishment of escrow, (2) payment into escrow, (3) delivery of 
deed to escrow, (4) partial conveyance, (5) payment to Farns-
worth Associates, DeGraff Associates' contract seller, by Amer-
ican Development Company, (6) final payment on or before Sep-
tember 30, 1985, (7) DeGraff's obligation to pay off the Lock-
hart Company, to which DeGraff Associates had assigned its con-
tract with Farnsworth Associates, (8) authority to subdivide, 
install roads, curbs, gutters, sidewalks, sewers and other im-
provements, and (9) default provisions. In addition to changes 
in the payment schedule, interest rate and down payments were 
changed. 
As indicated in Appellant's Brief, it is Holmes' posi-
tion that the Option was repudiated by DeGraff Associates, re-
scinded and discharged, and that all of the agreements of the 
parties merged into the final contract documents, discharging 
the Option, and that the Option was void because it violated 
the rule against perpetuities. 
The irony of this case is that DeGraff Associates con-
sistently refused to honor the Option, consistently and clearly 
indicated to Holmes that it would not honor the Option, and 
further asserted its position that the Option was void and un-
enforceable. Notwithstanding this position, DeGraff Associates 
would hold Holmes to paragraph 8 of the Option. 
(3) 
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Holmes has no argument with the proposition that a 
real estate broker may negotiate or compromise his real estate 
commission, or even waive it entirely. 1 Further, Holmes has 
no argument that had DeGraff Associates honored the Option, he 
would not be entitled to a commission. However, the evidence 
is clear and unequivocal that DeGraff Associates refused to 
honor the Option, repudiated it, and not only asserted its un-
enforceability, but further clearly stated that it would not 
perform in accordance with the terms of the Option. Having 
taken that position, DeGraff Associates is bound by the conse-
quences thereof. The consequences, under the circumstances of 
a new agreement with inconsistent terms, are that the Option is 
no longer valid or enforceable as against either party. 
!Respondent's brief states: 
The evidence showed, further, that Holmes privately 
assumed that the rules and regulations of the Multiple 
Listing Service would mandate payment of a commission 
regardless of his clear and unambiguous written agree-
ment to the contrary. 
Although generally accurate, the foregoing statement is mis-
leading because Holmes told DeGraff Associates his position at 
the time the Option was signed and thereafter. Nevertheless, 
Holmes' personal assumptions are irrelevant to the issues be-
fore this court. The relevant issues are the parties' agree-
ments and their actions with respect to their agreements. 
Holmes' view at the time the Option was signed was that the Op-
tion and the parties' agreements with the Multiple Listing Ser-
vice were inconsistent and that the Multiple Listing Service 
agreements would prevail as between the two. However, this was 
Holmes' personal view, without any benefit of legal counsel. 
Holmes acknowledges and has taken the position throughout this 
litigation that if DeGraff Associates had honored the Option 
and performed in accordance with its terms, he would have no 
claim for a commission. 
( 4) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DeGraff attempts to hold Holmes to the Option by say-
ing that the Option was culminated in the execution of the 
agreement and related documents on July 15, 1977. 2 The facts 
and evidence are contrary to these assertions. Not only is it 
clear that DeGraff Associates repudiated the option (Tr. 90-93, 
120-22, 147-48), DeGraff Associates considered that the option 
was not a final legally binding document. The testimony of Jay 
DeGraff, DeGraff Associates' president, is clear on the point: 
Q Mr. DeGraff, did you consider that there was a re-
quirement for a subsequent contract of sale after the 
option was signed? 
A I considered the option to be an on-going, leading to 
a contractual passing of title. 
Q You considered that the terms of the option had to be 
expanded, clarified or redefined or renegotiated? 
A That has been said repeatedly. We talked about that. 
Q I am asking you if that was your treatment, your atti-
tude before this option? 
A Certainly was. The option was binding with the excep-
tion of the fact that we had something that was never 
going to be paid off here. 
Q And that was not binding? 
2In its brief, DeGraff Associates states: 
Likewise, DeGraff, at all times, considered the 
option enforceable and treated the final closing of 
the sale as the culmination of the transactions con-
templated in the option as negotiated. (Brief of Re-
spondent, p. 4) 
Although DeGraff did raise questions as to the 
enforceability of the option agreement, DeGraff 
nevertheless did carry through with the sale of the 
properties and chose not to refuse to perform on the 
basis of unenforceability, which was peculiarly 
DeGraff's to raise. (Brief of Respondent, pp. 13-14) 
(5) 
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A Well, how can you have a contract that does not have 
an end to it? 
Q That is what I am asking of you. Can you or can you 
not? 
A Well, you can't 
(Tr. 138-139. J 
DeGraff's assumption that he could repudiate the payment provi-
sions of the Option but enforce other provisions does not make 
it so as a matter of law. On the contrary, a valid option, 
without more, is binding upon the parties thereto, requiring 
only proper exercise thereof to transform it to a binding con-
tract. Kier v. Condrack, 25 Utah 2d 139, 478 P.2d 327 (1970). 
In J. R. Stone Co., Inc. v. Keate, 576 P.2d 1285 (Utah 1978), 
this Court stated: "[T]he granting of an option to sell, sup-
ported by a consideration, commits the offeror to sell accord-
ing to the terms of the option until the option by its terms 
expires." (Footnote omitted.) 
DeGraff Associates clearly and unequivocally refused 
to sell according to the terms of the Option. When DeGraff 
Associates repudiated the Option and relied upon the rule 
against perpetuities and other legal theories as a basis for 
doing so, DeGraff Associates must be held to the consequences 
of its actions. The consequences are that the Option was no 
longer binding on the parties. Just as American Development 
Company is not entitled to rely on the payment provisions of 
the Option, or any other provision, DeGraff Associates is not 
entitled to rely on paragraph 8 of the Option to deny Holmes 
the real estate commission. 
( 6) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II. THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 
RENDERS THE OPTION VOID. 
After refusing to honor the option and specifically 
stating that it would not perform the option in accordance with 
its terms, DeGraff Associates asserted the option was invalid 
and unenforceable because of the rule against perpetuities. 
Holmes did not raise the rule, DeGraff Associates asserted it. 
Regardless of who asserted it, if the rule is applicable to the 
Option, the rule rendered the Option void from the inception. 
As stated by Professor Leach, Perpetuities In A Nutshell, 51 
Harvard Law Review 638 (1938): 
No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, 
not later than twenty-one years after some life in 
being the creation of the interest. 
Professor Leach explained the nature of the rule: 
The rule against perpetuities is a rule invali-
dating interest which vest too remotely. Indeed, it 
is often called the rule against remoteness of vesting. 
It is not a rule invalidating interests which 
last too long: 
He explains certain of the elements of the rule: 
A future interest is invalid unless it is absolutely 
certain that it must vest within the period of perpe-
tuities. Probability of vesting, however great, is 
not sufficient. Moreover, the certainty of vesting 
must have existed at the time the instrument took 
effect (i.e., the testator's death in the case of a 
will, the date of delivery in the case of a deed or 
trust). It is immaterial that the contingencies 
actually do occur within the permissible period or 
actually have occurred when the validity of the in-
strument is first litigated. (Emphasis added.) 
With respect to contracts and options specifically, Professor 
Leach states: 
( 7) 
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The rule against perpetuities is a rule of prop-
erty law, not a rule of the law of contracts. It is 
no objection to the enforceability of a contract that 
the liability thereunder does not accrue until a time 
beyond the period of perpetuities. Thus insurance and 
surety contracts (both contingent obligations) are 
valid without reference to the time when the contin-
gency may occur or payment may be required. 
However, if a contract for the transfer of prop-
erty is specifically enforceable, there is created in 
the promisee an equitable interest in the property; 
and the question arises whether this equitable inter-
est based upon the specific enforceability of a con-
tract, is subject to the rule against perpetuities. 
At the outset it should be stated that this question 
ought to be answered in the negative. Assuming that 
it is desirable to have some restriction upon the 
equitable interests created by specifically enforce-
able contracts, the rule against perpetuities does not 1 
offer an appropriate limitation. The period of lives 
in being and twenty-one years, which works admirably 
in regards to gift transactions for family purposes, 
has no significance in the world of commercial affairs. 
Options to purchase in gross. It has been held 
both in England and the United States that an option 
in gross to purchase land is void if it can be exer-
cised beyond the period of perpetuities. The objec-
tion to this rule is not in the options that it 
strikes down but in those that it permits. An option 
in gross is an effective preventative of the improve-
ment of the land over which it exists, unless (as is 
rarely, if ever, the case) the purchase price under 
the option fluctuates in accordance with the improved 
value of the land. As long as the option lasts the 
owner in possession cannot afford to make improvements 
which can be snatched away from him without compensa-
tion by the exercise of the option. To allow such a 
restraint to last for the period of perpetuities is 
monstrous. However, the common sense of land owners 
suffices to prevent this problem from being particu-
larly important. 
In the present case, the Option could not be exercised 
beyond the period of perpetuities. However, the Option when 
exercised became a contract which created only an equitable 
interest in the buyer (optionee) in the property described in 
the Option. The seller (optionor) retained the legal title. 
( 8) 
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Until the purchase price is paid in full, the seller has no 
obligation to convey. Since the purchase price is payable 
beyond the period of perpetuities, in fact in perpetuity, the 
legal title would not vest within the period allowed by the 
rule. 
This Court, in the case of Hidden Meadows Development 
Co. v. Mills, 511 P.2d 737 (Utah 1973), addressed the question 
of the applicability of the rule against perpetuities to an 
option. Although this Court found the rule inapplicable to the 
option in question, the case is instructive: 
A case most nearly supporting the contention of 
the defendants is that of Starcher Bros. v. Duty, 61 
W.Va. 373, 56 S.E. 524, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 913 (1907), 
wherein an option was held void. There the contract 
provided for an option for one year and for additional 
years thereafter so long as the optionee paid a stip-
ulated sum of money. 
That case is not controlling here for the reason 
that the landowner was obligated to convey at a time 
in the future which could be beyond the lives in being 
plus 21 years. The landowner was impotent to prevent 
the option from continuing from year to year. 
In the instant matter the optionee (plaintiff) 
has no such right. It only has an assurance of an 
option for the next ensuing year, and that by the per-
mission of the landowners (defendants), to wit, by 
their failure to cancel prior to October 1. The op-
tion does not violate the rule against perpetuities. 
There was nothing in the contract to indicate that the 
parties intended the option to continue for an un-
limited duration. It was merely a year-to-year op-
tion, subject to be defeated at the express desire of 
either party. It could not exist for more than 15 
months after notice of cancellation was given, and for 
a lesser time if notice should be given prior to the 
end of September. The option is good for one year 
only, and it can be renewed by an additional year only 
in case the defendants want it to be renewed. They 
manifest that wish by failing to give notice of can-
cellation prior to October 1 of any given year. 
(9) 
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As in the Starcher cash, cited in Hidden Meadows, in the pre-
sent case the optionor, DeGraff Associates, was impotent to 
prevent the contract from continuing forever. If valid, the 
option when exercised would require DeGraff Associates to con-
vey at a time in the future which could be beyond the lives in 
being plus 21 years. 
Policy considerations behind the rule against perpe-
tuities suggest that the Option should be void as against the 
rule. The Option, when exercised, would never pay out accord-
ing to its terms. Jay DeGraff immediately recognized that this 
was not a desirable contract -- the seller (optionor) had no 
control over when the contract would be paid in full, if ever. 
This should be the result, especially since DeGraff Associates 
asserted the rule as a basis for avoiding what it was obligated 
to do under the Option. 
Based upon the purpose of the rule against perpetui-
ties, this Court should rule that the Option was void as a 
matter of law. 
POINT III. THE EVIDENCE OF REPUDIATION, RESCISSION, AND 
DISCHARGE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING, AND UNCONTRADICTED. 
The evidence is clear that DeGraff Associates refused 
to honor the Option, declared the Option unenforceable, and 
specifically stated that they would not be bound by it or per-
form according to its terms. (Tr. 120-122, 93-94, 147-48.) 
This Court, by rules of appellate review, must defer to the 
findings of the trial court, if such findings are supported by 
the evidence. Further, the rules of appellate review require 
(10) 
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this Court to review the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the successful party at the trial court. Carnesecca v. Car-
nesecca, 572 P.2d 708 (Utah 1977). This rule does not require 
or allow the evidence to be altered or misconstrued. The un-
contradicted evidence in this case, even if viewed solely upon 
the testimony of DeGraff Associates' officers, requires find-
ings that the Option was repudiated, rescinded and disharged, 
and that the parties' agreements merged into the final Agree-
ment and documents signed contemporaneously therewith. Find-
ings against uncontradicted evidence of unimpeached witnesses 
will be set aside. Parker v. Weber County Irr. Dist., 68 Utah 
472, 251 P. 11 (1926). 
This Court should reverse the trial court and enter 
judgment in favor of Holmes for the amount of the commission 
due. 
POINT IV. THE BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS MISSTATES 
THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE. 
In order that this court does not have a misunder-
standing of the facts and the evidence before it, plaintiff 
deems it necessary to respond to certain statements contained 
in the Brief of Respondent. 
Respondent states: 
DeGraff, at all times, considered the Option enforce-
able and treated the final closing of the sale as the 
culmination of the transactions contemplated in the 
Option as negotiated. (Brief of Respondent, p. 4.) 
This is clearly inaccurate. Bruce Holmes testified that from 
June 17, the day the Option was signed, and until July 15, 
DeGraff Associates consistently asserted that the Option was 
(11) 
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unenforceable and stated that it would not perform in accor-
dance with its terms (Tr. 120-122). This testimony was con-
firmed by the testimony of Clara DeGraff wherein she recited 
the response of Jay DeGraff to the Option: 
DeGraff Associates was not going to sell the property 
under the Option, that under no circumstance would the 
Option go to fruition. (Tr. 93-94.) 
DeGraff Associates' counsel asserted the unenforceability of 
the Option (Tr. 147-48). This contradiction, i.e., that the 
Option was enforceable while asserting its unenforceability, 
can only be explained by Jay DeGraff's view that the Option was 
only a preliminary contract and that he was entitled to nego-
tiate additional and even inconsistent terms (Tr. 131-32, 138-
39). As explained in Point I above, an Option commits the Op-
tionor to sell according to the terms of the Option if it is 
exercised timely. 
Respondent states in its Brief: 
Negotiation of all terms of the sale with DeGraff were 
conducted by Holmes himself (Tr. 34, 43-44), and 
Holmes supplied to the title company the information 
to be included in the closing documents (Tr. 114). 
The evidence disclosed however that DeGraff, at no 
time prior to closing of sale, was made aware of any 
buyer being involved other than Holmes himself; and, 
in fact, upon closing, DeGraff still assumed that 
American Development Company, the ultimate buyer, was 
still Holmes doing business in another name. (Brief 
of Respondent, pp. 5, 6.) 
This suggests that Holmes concealed or withheld information 
from DeGraff Associates of a third-party. This is not accur-
ate. Clara DeGraff testified that on May 24, 1977, when Holmes 
(12) 
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called the very first time, he mentioned having a customer for 
it, and Clara DeGraff so noted in her log (Tr. 92). After the 
Option was signed, Holmes disclosed the involvement of Glen 
Saxton and American Development Company (Tr. 107). The final 
agreement of American Development Company and DeGraff Asso-
ciates was negotiated by Holmes on behalf of American Develop-
ment Company and by Craig DeGraff on behalf of DeGraff Asso-
ciates, Holmes and Craig DeGraff dealing with their respective 
principals (Tr. 113~114). Finally, when the final real estate 
agreement and corresponding documents were signed, DeGraff 
Associates knew it was not dealing with Holmes (Tr. 57). 
Respondent's Brief states: 
Holmes, further, argues on page 18 of his Brief that 
American Development Company (who is not a party at 
any time to the agreements in issue involving a com-
mission) somehow chose to discharge the contract be-
tween Holmes and DeGraff, and to negotiate a new 
agreement. Holmes does not explain the process by 
which any such action by this third party could pur-
portedly operate to obviate a separate agreement be-
tween Holmes and DeGraff. Moreover, Holmes' argument 
ignores the facts that (1) Holmes never entered into 
any subsequent agreement with DeGraff altering the 
terms of the Option agreement relative to a commission 
and no documents purporting to do so were ever offered 
into evidence; (2) the final agreement with American 
Development Company makes no mention at all of a com-
mission; and (3) Holmes' argument assumes facts con-
trary to the trial court's express findings. (Brief 
of Respondent, pp. 16-17.) 
The foregoing is particularly interesting in view of the trial 
court's findings of facts, prepared by counsel for Respondent: 
On July 15, 1977, the plaintiff assigned all of his 
right, title and interest in the Option Agreement to 
American Development Company. As a result of this 
assignment, American Development Company assumed all 
right, interest and standing of the plaintiff in and 
to the Option Agreement. 
(13) 
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The process of discharge of the contract between Holmes and 
DeGraff is obvious. There is no inconsistency in American 
Development Company as the assignee of the Option excepting 
DeGraff Associates' offer of rescission and discharging the 
Option only upon DeGraff Associates' execution of a new agree-
ment, especially in view of the clearly stated position of 
DeGraff Associates of the unenforceability of the Option. In 
other words, as assignee of the Option, American Development 
Company was entitled to rely upon and consider the Option valid 
and enforceable and to pursue remedies attendant therewith if 
it so chose, until DeGraff Associates executed a new agreement 
which rescinded and discharged the Option. The point which 
respondent seems to miss is that the law of repudiation, re-
scission and discharge terminates the Option. When thus ter-
minated, being of no further force and effect, the agreements 
of Holmes and DeGraff Associates with the Multiple Listing 
Service were then applicable and based upon those agreements, 
Holmes is entitled to a commission. 
Respondent's Brief states: 
[T]he evidence indicated that Holmes (ostensibly in 
good faith) agreed in writing that no commission would 
be payable while he, at the same time, secretly in-
tended to seek a commission regardless of the express 
agreement. (Brief of Respondent, p. 19.) 
In response, see footnote 1, page 4, and accompanying text. 
Holmes takes issue with Finding 13 of the trial court: 
At all times the plaintiff's agreement was in 
effect whereby no commission would be payable from the 
defendant to the plaintiff in connection with the sale 
of the subject property. 
(14) 
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This is a conclusion of law, but whether a finding of fact or 
conclusion of law, it is not supported by the evidence. The 
trial court did not enter any conclusions that DeGraff Asso-
ciates repudiated, rescinded or discharged the Option nor that 
the Option was terminated by merger by the final Agreement and 
contemporaneous documents. The trial court did not enter any 
findings that the Option, by its terms would never pay the pur-
chase price. Nevertheless, the evidence is clear, convincing, 
uncontradicted and undisputed which would lead to such findings 
and conclusions. 
This Court must so find and reverse the trial court 
with instructions to enter judgment in plaintiff's favor. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence in this 
case is clear, convincing, unrepudiated and unimpeached that 
the Option was (a) repudiated by DeGraff Associates, (b) re-
scinded and discharged, and (c) merged into the final agree-
ments of American Development Company and DeGraff Associates. 
In addition, the rule against perpetuities rendered the Option 
void. Under any of these legal theories, the Option ceased to 
be binding upon DeGraff Associates or Holmes. This evidence 
requires this Court to reverse the trial court and enter judg-
ment in favor of plaintiff-appellant in the sum of $51,660. 
(15) 
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DATED this 12th day of May, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
Wayne G. Petty 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Appellant Bruce E. Holmes 
600 Deseret Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 12th day of May, 198 0, I 
served two copies of the attached Reply Brief of Appellant by 
mailing a copy thereof in a securely sealed, postage prepaid 
envelope to the following at the address indicated: 
Neil R. Sabin, Esq. 
200 North Main, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
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